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Abstract
We look at lying as an act of communication, where (i) the proposition
that is communicated is not true, (ii) the utterer of the lie knows that
what she communicates is not true, and (iii) the utterer of the lie
intends the lie to be taken as truth. Rather than dwell on the moral
issues, we provide a sketch of what goes on logically when a lie is
communicated. We present a complete logic of manipulative updating,
to analyse the eﬀects of lying in public discourse. Next, we turn to the
study of lying in games. First, a game-theoretical analysis is used to
explain how the possibility of lying makes such games interesting, and
how lying is put to use in optimal strategies for playing the game.
Finally, we give a matching logical analysis. Our running example of
lying in games in liar’s dice.
1 Open the window that the lies may ﬂy out
I will tell you something. I saw two roasted fowls ﬂying; they
ﬂew quickly and had their breasts turned to Heaven and their
backs to Hell; and an anvil and a mill-stone swam across the
Rhine prettily, slowly, and gently; and a frog sat on the ice at
Whitsuntide and ate a ploughshare.
Four fellows who wanted to catch a hare, went on crutches and
stilts; one of them was deaf, the second blind, the third dumb,
and the fourth could not stir a step. Do you want to know how
it was done? First, the blind man saw the hare running across
the ﬁeld, the dumb one called to the deaf one, and the lame one
seized it by the neck.
There were certain men who wished to sail on dry land, and they
set their sails in the wind, and sailed away over great ﬁelds. Then
1they sailed over a high mountain, and there they were miserably
drowned.
A crab was chasing a hare which was running away at full speed;
and high up on the roof lay a cow which had climbed up there.
In that country the ﬂies are as big as the goats are here.
Open the window that the lies may ﬂy out.
Jacob Ludwig Grimm and Wilhelm Carl Grimm, The Ditmarsch
Tale of Wonders [Gri44].
2 What is a Lie?
Whatever a lie is, the text on Ren´ e Magritte’s famous picture is not an
example.
Magritte himself has tried to explain why this is not a lie:
La fameuse pipe, me l’a-t-on assez reproch´ ee! Et pourtant,
pouvez-vous la bourrer ma pipe? Non, n’est-ce pas, elle n’est
qu’une repr´ esentation. Donc si j’avais ´ ecrit sous mon tableau
‘ceci est une pipe’, j’aurais menti!
[This famous pipe, how have I been reproached for it! But you
cannot stuﬀ it with tobacco, can you? No, for it is just an image.
So had I written under my picture ‘This is a pipe’ I would have
lied.]
In this quote, Magritte equates lying with saying things that are not true,
and asserts that he—on this particular occasion—was not guilty of that.
2The church father St. Augustine, who wrote at length about lying in De
Mendacio [Aug88], holds a more subtle view on what is a lie and on what
it is not.
For not every one who says a false thing lies, if he believes or
opines that to be true which he says. Now between believing and
opining there is this diﬀerence, that sometimes he who believes
feels that he does not know that which he believes, (although
he may know himself to be ignorant of a thing, and yet have no
doubt at all concerning it, if he most ﬁrmly believes it:) whereas
he who opines, thinks he knows that which he does not know.
Now whoever utters that which he holds in his mind either as
belief or as opinion, even though it be false, he lies not. For this
he owes to the faith of his utterance, that he thereby produce
that which he holds in his mind, and has in that way in which
he produces it. Not that he is without fault, although he lie not,
if either he believes what he ought not to believe, or thinks he
knows what he knows not, even though it should be true: for he
accounts an unknown thing for a known.
Augustine, De Mendacio (On Lying), ca. AD 395 [Aug88]
And on what lying is:
Wherefore, that man lies, who has one thing in his mind and
utters another in words, or by signs of whatever kind. Whence
also the heart of him who lies is said to be double; that is, there is
a double thought: the one, of that thing which he either knows
or thinks to be true and does not produce; the other, of that
thing which he produces instead thereof, knowing or thinking it
to be false. Whence it comes to pass, that he may say a false
thing and yet not lie, if he thinks it to be so as he says although
it be not so; and, that he may say a true thing, and yet lie, if he
thinks it to be false and utters it for true, although in reality it
be so as he utters it. For from the sense of his own mind, not
from the verity or falsity of the things themselves, is he to be
judged to lie or not to lie. Therefore he who utters a false thing
for a true, which however he opines to be true, may be called
erring and rash: but he is not rightly said to lie; because he has
not a double heart when he utters it, neither does he wish to
deceive, but is deceived. But the fault of him who lies, is, the
3desire of deceiving in the uttering of his mind; whether he do
deceive, in that he is believed when uttering the false thing; or
whether he do not deceive, either in that he is not believed, or
in that he utters a true thing with will to deceive, which he does
not think to be true: wherein being believed, he does not deceive
though it was his will to deceive: except that he deceives in so
far as he is thought to know or think as he utters.
Augustine, [Aug88]
We cannot do better than to follow Augustine in assuming that intent to
mislead is part of the deﬁnition of a liar. Thus, to us, lying about p is
communicating p in the knowledge that ¬p is the case, with the intent to
be believed.
For the moral sides to the issue of lying, see the ninth of the ten command-
ments (‘Thou shalt not bear false witness’), the fourth of the ﬁve Buddhist
precepts (‘I undertake the precept to refrain from false speech’), and, on
the other hand, the Analects of Confucius, where Confucius is quoted as
condoning a lie, if its purpose is to preserve social structure:
The Governor of She said to Confucius, ‘In our village we have
an example of a straight person. When the father stole a sheep,
the son gave evidence against him.’ Confucius answered, ‘In
our village those who are straight are quite diﬀerent. Fathers
cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. In
such behaviour is straightness to be found as a matter of course.’
Analects, 13.18.
Among philosophical treatises, the quoted text of Augustine is a classic.1
For more, see [Bok78] and [Are06] and the references therein.
Rather than dwell on the moral side of the issue of lying, in this paper
we will study its logic, focussing on simple cases of lying in game situations,
and on a particular kind of public announcement that may or may not be
deceptive (we call these ‘manipulative updates’). Thus, we abstract from
the moral issues; we feel that it is important to understand why lying is
tempting (why and how it pays oﬀ) before one turns to moral condemnation
or absolution.
1We found a site on the internet where the views of the writer De Mendacio on lying
are expounded.
43 The Logic of Communication and Change
The logic of communication and change presented in [BvEK06] provides
means to model communicative actions and actions that change the world,
and their eﬀects in given epistemic situations. In this section we introduce
the syntax and semantics of the logic. In the next sections we show how this
machinery can be put to use to analyse manipulation in public discourse
and to describe what goes on in the game of Liar’s Dice.
Deﬁnition 1 (Epistemic models) Let a set of propositional variables P
and a ﬁnite set of agents Ag be given. An epistemic model is a triple M =
(W,V,R) where W is a set of worlds, V : W → P(P) assigns a valuation to
each world w ∈ W, and R : Ag → P(W2) assigns an accessibility relation
i → to each agent i ∈ Ag.
A pair M = (M,U) with U ⊆ W is a multiple pointed epistemic model,
indicating that the actual world is among U.
[BMS03] proposes to model epistemic actions as epistemic models, with
valuations replaced by preconditions. (See also: [Bal02; BM04; BMS99;
Ben01; Ben02; Dit00; FHMV95; Ger99; Koo03].) [BvEK06] proposes to add
substitutions for modelling change in the world (this proposal is based on
[Eij04]). See also [DvdHK05]. The story of update logic with substitutions
is retold for a fragment in [Koo07].
Deﬁnition 2 (Substitutions) LANG substitutions are functions of type
LANG → LANG that distribute over all language constructs, and that map
all but a ﬁnite number of basic propositions to themselves. LANG substitu-
tions can be represented as sets of bindings
{p1 7→ φ1,...,pn 7→ φn}
where all the pi are diﬀerent . If σ is a LANG substitution, then the set
{p ∈ P | σ(p) 6= p} is called its domain, notation dom(σ). Use  for the
identity substitution. Let SubLANG be the set of all LANG substitutions.
Deﬁnition 3 (Epistemic Models under a Substitution) If
M = (W,V,R)
is an epistemic model and σ is a LANG substitution (for an appropriate
epistemic language LANG), then V σ
M is the valuation given by λp·[[σ(p)]]M.
In other words, V σ
M assigns to w the set of worlds w in which σ(p) is true.
For M = (W,V,R), call Mσ the model given by (W,V σ
M,R).
5Deﬁnition 4 (Action models for a given language L) Let a ﬁnite set
of agents Ag and an epistemic language L be given. An action model for L
is a quadruple A = (W,pre,sub,R) where W is a set of action states, pre :
W → L assigns a precondition to each action state, sub : W → SubLANG
assigns a substitution to each action state, and R : Ag → P(W2) assigns an
accessibility relation
i → to each agent i ∈ Ag.
A pair A = (A,S) with S ⊆ W is a multiple-pointed action model,
indicating that the actual action that takes place is a member of S.
The epistemic language LANG is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 (LANG) Assume p ranges over set of basic propositions P,
i ranges over the set of agents Ag. The formulas of LANG are given by:
φ ::= > | p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | [α]φ | [A,S]φ,
α ::= i | α1 ∪ α2 | α1;α2| α∗,
where (A,S) is a multiple pointed ﬁnite LANG (action) model.
We employ the usual abbreviations. In particular, φ1 ∨ φ2 is shorthand
for ¬(¬φ1 ∧ ¬φ2), φ1 → φ2 for ¬(φ1 ∧ ¬φ2), hαiφ for ¬[α]¬φ, hA,Siφ for
¬[A,S]¬φ. Note that the standard epistemic language is a sublanguage of
LANG, with ”[α]φ” and ”[(∪i∈Agi)∗]φ” interpreted as ”Kiφ” and ”Cφ”,
respectively.2
Let MOD be the class of multiple pointed epistemic models and ACT
the class of multiple pointed ﬁnite LANG models. Then LANG-update is
an operation of the following type:
⊗ : MOD × ACT → MOD.
The operation ⊗ and the truth deﬁnition for LANG are deﬁned by mutual
recursion, as follows.
Deﬁnition 6 (Update, Truth) Given a multiple pointed epistemic model
(M,U) and an action model (A,S), we deﬁne
(M,U) ⊗ (A,S)
2The reason to employ multiple pointed models for updating is that it allows us to
handle choice. Suppose we want to model the action of testing whether φ, followed by
a public announcement of the result. This involves choice: if the outcome of the test
is aﬃrmative, then do this, else do that. Choice is modelled in a straightforward way
in multiple pointed action models. Once we allow multiple pointed action models, it is
reasonable to also take our epistemic models to be multiple pointed, with the multiple
points constraining the whereabouts of the actual world.
6as
((W0,V 0,R0),U0),
where
W0 := {(w,s) | w ∈ WM,s ∈ WA,M |=w pres},
V 0(w,s) := {p ∈ P | M |=w suba(p),
(w,s)
i → (w0,s0) ∈ R0 :≡ w
i → w0 ∈ RM and s
i → s0 ∈ RA,
U0 := {(u,s) | u ∈ U,s ∈ S,(u,s) ∈ W0},
and where the truth deﬁnition is given by:
M |=w > always
M |=w p :≡ p ∈ VM(w)
M |=w ¬φ :≡ not M |=w φ
M |=w φ1 ∧ φ2 :≡ M |=w φ1 and M |=w φ2
M |=w [α]φ :≡ for all w0 with w
α → w0 M |=w0 φ
M |=w [A,S]φ :≡ (W0,V 0,R0) |=(w,s) φ for all (w,s) ∈ U0,
where ((W0,V 0,R0),U0) = (M,{w}) ⊗ (A,S).
In this deﬁnition
α1∪α2 → is the relation
α1 → ∪
α2 →,
α1;α2 → is
{(x,y)|∃z(x
α1 → z)&(z
α2 → y)},
and
α∗
→ is the transitive closure of
α →.
In [BvEK06] it is shown that this logic is axiomatized by the axioms
and inference rules of epistemic PDL, plus a set of reduction axioms that
are generated from the action models by means of a process of program
transformation. In the next section we will use (an appropriate fragment of)
this logical system to model what goes on in manipulative communication,
and in Section 6 we will employ it to analyze what goes on in Liar’s Dice.
4 The Logic of Lying in Public Discourse
The topic of truthfulness in public life is a particularly important one:
It has frequently been noted that the surest result of brainwash-
ing in the long run is a peculiar kind of cynicism, the absolute
refusal to believe in the truth of anything, no matter how well
7it may be established. In other words, the result of a consistent
and total substitution of lies for factual truth is not that the lie
will now be accepted as truth, and truth be defamed as lie, but
that the sense by which we take our bearings in the real world—
and the category of truth versus falsehood is among the mental
means to this end—is being destroyed.
Hannah Arendt, “Truth and Politics”, 1967 [Are06].
Below we will give a logic of possibly deceptive public speech acts, to model
the eﬀects of lying in politics. Our modelling shows that Arendt is right
about the grave consequences of lying in politics.
First, take the protypical example of lying about p. Picture an initial
situation where agent a knows that p, and agent a knows that that agents
b,c do not know that p. One way to picture this initial situation is like this:
0
1:[p]
bc
2:[p]
abc
bc
Here the double oval indicates that 1 is the actual world. Note that here
agents b,c still consider it possible that a does not know whether p.
In typical examples of bearing witness in court, the situation is often a
bit diﬀerent. In cases of providing an alibi, for example, the question ‘Was
the accused at home with you during the evening of June 6th?’ is posed on
the understanding that the witness is in a position to know the true answer,
even if nobody can check that she is telling the truth.
Let us assume that everyone knows that a knows whether p. The picture
now becomes:
80
1:[p]
bc
Assume agent a sends a group communication to b,c to the eﬀect that ¬p.
Would this be a correct communication model for the lie that ¬p?
0:-p
1:T
a
It is easy to see that this cannot be right. The result of this update is a
model that has no actual worlds, i.e., an inconsistent model. The actual
worlds of an update are pairs (w,a) where w is an actual world of the input
epistemic model and a an actual action of the update model, and w satisﬁes
the precondition of a. Since the actual world has p true, and the precondition
of the actual action is ¬p, there are no such pairs.
Rather, the misleading communication should be modelled as a KD45
action model, as follows:
90:T a
1:-p
b c
a b c
The misleading agent a knows that no truthful communication is being
made, but the two agents b,c mistakenly believe that ¬p is being truthfully
asserted. Updating the initial model with this gives:
0 a b c
1:[p]
b c
a
This is a model where a knows that p, where b,c mistakenly believe that
¬p, and where b,c also believe that a believes (knows) that ¬p. Note that
the model is KD45: beliefs are still consistent ([i]φ → hiiφ holds in the
model), but the model is not truthful anymore (there are φ and i for which
[i]φ → φ does not hold). The postulate of truthfulness has been replaced by
the weaker postulate of consistency.
This way to model lying suggests a natural generalization of the well-
studied concept of a public announcement. In the logic of public announ-
cements [Pla89; Ger99], a public announcement !φ is always taken to be a
true statement. Unfortunately, this is not completely realistic.
A more realistic version of public announcements leaves open the possi-
bility of deceit, as follows. A possibly deceptive public announcement φ is a
kind of ‘if then else’ action. In case φ is true, the announcement is a public
update with φ, in case φ is false, the public is deceived into taking φ as true.
The manipulative update with p, in a setting where the public consists of
a,b,c, looks like this:
100:-p
1:p
a bc
a b c
2:p a b c
There are two actual actions, one for the situation where p is true — in this
case, the public is duly informed — and one for the situation where p is false
— in this case the public is misled to believe that p. This action model can
be simpliﬁed, as follows:
0:-p
1:p
a bc
a b c
Call this the two-pointed manipulative update for φ. We will refer to this
action model as Uφ. The variation on this action model where only action 0
is actual will be referred to as U0
φ. This action model denotes the lie with φ.
The variant with only action 1 actual will be referred to as U1
φ. This action
models denotes the public announcement with φ.
Let us introduce operations for these actions. The manipulative update
with φ is denoted ‡φ, and its two variants ¡φ (for the lie that φ) and !φ (for
the public announcement that φ).
Now it turns out that the logic of individual belief and manipulative
update, has a simple axiomatisation in terms of reduction axioms, just like
the logic of individual knowledge and public announcement.
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | Biφ | [‡φ1]φ2 | [¡φ1]φ2 | [!φ1]φ2
Interpretation as sketched above:
11• [‡φ]ψ is true in a model M at a world w if ψ is true in both (w,0) and
(w,1) of updated model M ⊗ U.
• [¡φ]ψ is true in a model M at a world w if ψ is true in (w,0) of updated
model M ⊗ U0.
• [!φ]ψ is true in a model M at a world w if ψ is true in (w,1) of updated
model M ⊗ U1.
Complete axiomatisation: the usual KD45 axioms for Bi, modus ponens,
necessitation for Bi, ‡φ, ¡φ and !φ, and reduction axioms for the [‡φ], [¡φ],
[!φ] modalities:
[‡φ]ψ ↔ [¡φ]ψ ∧ [!φ]ψ
This deﬁnes the eﬀect of [‡φ] in terms of those of [!φ] and [¡φ]. Next, we
have the usual reduction axioms for public announcement:
[!φ]p ↔ φ → p
[!φ]¬ψ ↔ φ → ¬[!φ]ψ
[!φ](ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ↔ [!φ]ψ1 ∧ [!φ]ψ2
[!φ]Biψ ↔ φ → Bi[!φ]ψ
Finally, the reduction axioms for lying:
[¡φ]p ↔ ¬φ → p
[¡φ]¬ψ ↔ ¬φ → ¬[¡φ]ψ
[¡φ](ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ↔ [¡φ]ψ1 ∧ [¡φ]ψ2
[¡φ]Biψ ↔ ¬φ → Bi[!φ]ψ
The ﬁnal axiom of this list is the most interesting: it expresses that believing
ψ after a lie that φ amounts to the belief that a public announcement of φ
implies ψ, conditioned by ¬φ.
Since all these axioms have the form of equivalences, completeness of
the calculus of manipulation and individual belief follows from a reduction
argument, as in the case of public announcements with individual knowledge:
Theorem 7 The calculus of manipulation and individual belief is complete.
Public announcements can be expressed in terms of manipulative updat-
ing:
12Proposition 8 ` [!φ]ψ ↔ (φ → [‡φ]ψ).
The proof is by induction on ψ. But note that the logic of manipulative
updating is more expressive than the logic of public announcement. The
logic of [!φ] has no means to express an operation mapping S5 models to
KD45 models, and [‡φ] is such an operation.
As an example of reasoning with the calculus, we use the axioms to
show that a manipulative update followed by a belief is equivalent to a
belief followed by the corresponding public announcement:
Proposition 9 ` [‡φ]Biψ ↔ Bi[!φ]ψ.
Proof.
[‡φ]Biψ ↔ [¡φ]Biψ ∧ [!φ]Biψ
↔ (¬φ → Bi[!φ]ψ) ∧ (φ → Bi[!φ]ψ)
↔ Bi[!φ]ψ
2
An important diﬀerence between manipulative update and public an-
nouncement shows up when we work out the preconditions of inconsistency
after an update. For announcements we get:
Proposition 10 ` [!φ]⊥ ↔ ¬φ.
Proof.
[!φ]⊥ ↔ [!φ](p ∧ ¬p)
↔ [!φ]p ∧ [!φ]¬p
↔ [!φ]p ∧ (φ → ¬[!φ]p
↔ (φ → p) ∧ (φ → ¬p)
↔ ¬φ
2
This shows that a public announcement with φ leads to an inconsistent
state iﬀ the negation of φ is true. Similarly, it is easy to work out that a
public lie that φ leads to an inconsistency iﬀ φ is true, i.e., we can derive
Proposition 11 ` [¡φ]⊥ ↔ φ.
Using this we can work out the preconditions for inconsistency after a ma-
nipulative update:
13Proposition 12 ` [‡φ]⊥ ↔ ⊥.
Proof.
[‡φ]⊥ ↔ [!φ]⊥ ∧ [¡φ]⊥
Prop 11
↔ ¬φ ∧ φ
↔ ⊥
2 This means that a manipulative update in a consistent state will never
lead to inconsistency.
The following proposition about public announcements can be proved
by induction on φ:
Proposition 13 ` [!⊥]φ ↔ >.
In the case of manipulatively updating with an inconsistency, the re-
sult is not an inconsistent model, but a model where all accessibilities have
vanished. In the particular case of an i-belief, we get:
Proposition 14 ` [‡⊥]Biφ ↔ >.
Proof.
[‡⊥]Biφ ↔ [!⊥]Biφ ∧ [¡⊥]Biφ
↔ > ∧ Bi[!⊥]φ
↔ Bi[!⊥]φ
Prop 13
↔ Bi>
↔ >
2
After an a manipulative update with an inconsistency, the public will no
longer be able to distinguish what is false from what is true.
Finally, the following proposition spells out under what conditions our
‘sense by which we take our bearings in the real world’ is destroyed. This
happens exactly when we are manipulated into acccepting as truth what
ﬂatly contradicts our ﬁrm belief:
Proposition 15 ` [‡φ]Bi⊥ ↔ Bi¬φ.
14Proof.
[‡φ]Bi⊥ ↔ [!φ]Bi⊥ ∧ [¡φ]Bi⊥
↔ (φ → Bi[!φ]⊥) ∧ (¬φ → Bi[!φ]⊥)
↔ (φ → Bi¬φ) ∧ (¬φ → Bi¬φ)
↔ Bi¬φ
2
The full logic of manipulative updating, to which we now turn, consists
of epistemic PDL extended with manipulative updates, lies and announce-
ments:
α ::= i |?φ | α1;α2 | α1 ∪ α2 | α∗
φ ::= p | ¬φ | φ1 ∧ φ2 | [α]φ | [‡φ1]φ2 | [¡φ1]φ2 | [!φ1]φ2
Again, there is a complete axiomatisation: the axioms and rules of PDL,
necessitation for [‡φ], [¡φ], [!φ], and the following reduction axioms for the
three update modalities.
Deﬁnition of ‡ in terms of ¡ and !, as before:
[‡φ]ψ ↔ [¡φ]ψ ∧ [!φ]ψ
Reduction axioms for public announcement:
[!φ]p ↔ φ → p
[!φ]¬ψ ↔ φ → ¬[!φ]ψ
[!φ](ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ↔ [!φ]ψ1 ∧ [!φ]ψ2
[!φ][i]ψ ↔ [?φ;i][!φ]ψ
[!φ][?χ]ψ ↔ [?φ;?χ][!φ]ψ
[!φ][α1;α2]ψ ↔ [!φ][α1][α2]ψ
[!φ][α1 ∪ α2]ψ ↔ [!φ]([α1]ψ ∧ [α2]ψ)
[!φ][α∗]ψ ↔ [α0∗][!φ]ψ
where α0 such that [!φ][α]ψ ↔ [α0][!φ]ψ
It can be shown by an inductive argument that for every epistemic program
α, every announcement !φ, and every postcondition ψ an epistemic program
α0 exists such that [!φ][α]ψ ↔ [α0][!φ]ψ,
15Reduction axioms for public lies:
[¡φ]p ↔ ¬φ → p
[¡φ]¬ψ ↔ ¬φ → ¬[¡φ]ψ
[¡φ](ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ↔ [¡φ]ψ1 ∧ [¡φ]ψ2
[¡φ][i]ψ ↔ [?¬φ;i][!φ]ψ
[¡φ][?χ]ψ ↔ [?¬φ;?χ][!φ]ψ
[¡φ][α1;α2]ψ ↔ [¡φ][α1][α2]ψ
[¡φ][α1 ∪ α2]ψ ↔ [¡φ]([α1]ψ ∧ [α2]ψ)
[¡φ][α∗]ψ ↔ [α0;α00∗][!φ]ψ
where α0 such that [¡φ][α]ψ ↔ [α0][!φ]ψ
and α00 such that [!φ][α]ψ ↔ [α00][!φ]ψ
Again, it can be shown by an inductive argument that for every epistemic
program α, every lie ¡φ, and every postcondition ψ, an epistemic programs
α0 exists such that [¡φ][α]ψ ↔ [α0][!φ]ψ.
The α0 and α00 in the axioms for α∗ can be viewed as the transformed
versions of the programs α, where the update operator acts as an epistemic
program transformer. To give an example, suppose α = i ∪ j, and we want
to calculate the way common belief of i and j is transformed by a public lie
that φ. Then the transformed program for i∪j becomes ?¬φ;i∪j, and the
reduction axiom takes the shape:
[¡φ][(i ∪ j)∗]ψ ↔ [(¬φ;i ∪ j)∗][!φ]ψ.
This expresses that after a lie with φ, i and j have a common belief that
ψ iﬀ in the model before the lie it holds that along all i ∪ j paths through
¬φ worlds, [!φ]ψ is true. Note that this is a ‘relativized common belief’
similar to the relativized common knowledge that is needed to get a reduc-
tion style analysis going of public announcement in the presence of common
knowledge.
In fact, the style of axiomatisation that we have adopted is borrowed
from the reduction axioms formulated in terms of program transformations,
in [BvEK06]. In the same manner as in [BvEK06] we can derive:
Theorem 16 The calculus of manipulative updating is complete.
165 Liar’s Dice — Game Theoretical Analysis
In his later years as a saint, Augustine held the opinion that lying, even in
jest, is wrong, but as the young and playful sinner that he was before his
turn to seriousness he may well have enjoyed an occasional game of dice.
We will examine a simpliﬁed version of two-person Liar’s Dice, and show
by means of a game-theoretical analysis that it is precisely the possibility of
lying — using private information in order to mislead an opponent — that
makes the game interesting.
In our simpliﬁed version of Liar’s Dice, the die is replaced by a coin. A
typical move of the game is tossing a coin and inspecting the result while
keeping it hidden from the other player. Here is a description of what goes
on, and what the options of the two players are.
• Players 1 and 2 both stake one euro.
• Player 1 tosses a coin and observes the outcome (heads or tails), while
keeping it concealed from player 2.
• Player 1 sees or raises.
• If 1 sees, and the toss was heads, she wins the stake and the game
ends. If 1 sees, and the toss was tails, she loses the stake and the game
ends.
• If 1 raises, she adds one euro to the stake.
• In response to 1 raising, 2 either passes (gives up) or meets (adds 1
euro to the stake).
• If 2 passes, 1 wins the stake, and the game ends.
• If 2 meets, and the toss was heads, 1 wins the stake, otherwise 2 wins
the stake. The game ends.
Player 1 has two information states: Heads and Tails, while player 2 has
a single information state, for player 2 cannot distinguish the two possible
outcomes of the toss. We will give a game theoretic analysis of how player
1 can exploit her ‘information advantage’ to the utmost, and of how player
2 can react to minimize her losses, on the assumption that the procedure is
repeated a large number of times. The following picture gives the extensive
game form. The ﬁrst move is made by Chance; this move gives the outcome
of the coin toss. Then player 1 reacts, letting her move depend on the toss
17outcome. Finally, player 2 decides whether to pass or meet. This decision
does not depend on the coin toss; player 2 cannot distinguish the state
where 1 has raised on seeing heads from the state where she is bluﬃng.
In the following picture of the extensive game form, this is expressed by a
dotted line.
Chance
1
Heads 
1
Tails 
1,-1
See 
2
Raise 
2
Raise  -1,1
See 
1,-1
Pass 
2,-2
Meet 
1,-1
Pass 
-2,2
Meet 
The leafs of the game tree indicate the payoﬀs. If the game sequence
is heads, see, the payoﬀs are 1 euro for player 1 and −1 euro for player 2.
Similarly for the sequences heads, raise, pass, and tail, raise, pass (these are
the sequences where 2 gives up). The sequence tails, see is a win for player
2: here 1 loses 1 euro and 2 gains 1 euro. The sequence heads, raise, meet
is a win for player 1, with payoﬀ 2 euros, and −2 euros for player 2. The
18sequence tails, raise, meet, ﬁnally, is a win for player 2, with payoﬀ 2 euros,
and −2 euros loss for player 1.
Player 1 has four strategies: (Raise,Raise) (raise in case of heads and
in case of tails), (Raise,See) (raise in case of heads, see in case of tails),
(See,Raise), and (See,See). Player 2 has two strategies: Pass and Meet. To
ﬁnd the strategic game form, one has to take the average of the expected
payoﬀs for the two cases of heads and tails. E.g., if player 1 plays (Raise,See)
and player 2 responds with Meet, then in the long run in 1
2 of the cases the
outcome will be heads, and player 1 wins 2 euros, and in 1
2 of the cases the
outcome will be tails, and player 1 loses 1 euro (for her strategy is just to
give up in such cases). Thus, the expected payoﬀ is 1
2 × 2 − 1
2 × 1 = 1
2 euro
for player 1, and because the game is zero sum, −1
2 euro for player 2. The
strategic game form is given by:
Pass Meet
Raise,Raise 1,-1 0,0
Raise, See 0,0 1
2,−1
2
See, Raise 1,-1 −1
2, 1
2
See, See 0,0 0,0
It is easy to see that there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium (a Nash
equilibrium is a combination of strategies, one for each player, with the
property that neither of the players can improve their payoﬀ by unilaterally
deviating from her strategy). Clearly, none of the eight strategy pairs has
this property.
Now let’s consider the strategy (See,See) for 1. This is the strategy of
complete honesty; it consists of not using the information about the outcome
of the toss at all. Observe that this is not the best thing that 1 can do.
Observing the outcome of the toss, and always raising when the outcome
is heads, and sometimes lying when the outcome is tail, will give a better
payoﬀ in the long run. In other words, the strategy (See,See) is strictly
dominated by an equal mix of (Raise,Raise) and (Raise,See). That is: using
the information about the outcome of the coin toss, raising when it is heads
and lying in one half of the cases when it is tails is always a better strategy
for player 1 than not using the information about the outcome of the toss
at all.
Another observation is this. Consider the strategy of seeing in case of
heads and always raising in case of tails. Player 2 can take advantage of
this by calling the bluﬀs more often than not. Thus, (See,Raise) is not
a good response to any 2-strategy that favours Meet over Pass. In other
19words: playing honest in case the outcome is heads, and always lying when
the outcome is tails is a 1-strategy that can be exploited by player 2, which
means that player 1 should not choose it. Thus, we are left with:
Pass Meet
Raise,Raise 1,-1 0,0
Raise, See 0,0 1
2,−1
2
Suppose 1 plays (Raise,Raise) with probability p and (Raise,See) with pro-
bability 1−p. Then her expected value is p for her ﬁrst strategy, and 1
2(1−p)
for her second strategy. Any choice of p where the expected payoﬀ for p is
diﬀerent from that for 1−p can be exploited by the other player. Therefore,
player 1 should play her ﬁrst strategy with probability p = 1
2(1 − p), i.e.,
p = 1
3, and her second strategy with probability 1 − p = 2
3. For player 2,
we can reason similarly. Suppose 2 plays Pass with probability q and Meet
with probability 1−q. Again, the expected values for q and 1−q should be
the same, for otherwise this mixed strategy can be exploited by the other
player. The expected value is −q for her ﬁrst strategy and −1
2(1−q) for her
second strategy. Thus, she should play her ﬁrst strategy with probability
q = 1
2(1 − q), i.e., q = 1
3. Neither player can improve on her payoﬀ by
unilateral deviation from these strategies, so the mixed strategy where 1
plays (Raise,Raise) in 1
3 of the cases and 2 plays Pass in 1
3 of the cases is a
Nash equilibrium. In other words, the best that player 1 can do is always
raising the stakes when her toss is heads, and lying in one third of the cases
when her toss is tails, and 2’s best response to this is to pass in one third of
all cases. The game theoretic analysis yields that lying pays oﬀ for player
1, and that player 2, knowing this, may reasonably expect to catch player 1
on a lie in one sixth of all cases. The value of the game is 1
3 euro, and the
solution is 1
3 (Raise,Raise), 2
3 (Raise,See) as player 1’s optimal strategy, and
1
3 Pass, 2
3 Meet as player 2’s optimal strategy.
If we modify the game so that player 1 cannot lie anymore, by refusing her
the privilege of having a peek at the toss outcome, the game immedidately
becomes a lot less interesting. In the extensive game form for this version,
an extra dotted line indicates that player 1 cannot distinguish the outcome
Heads from the outcome Tails:
20Chance
1
Heads 
1
Tails 
1,-1
See 
2
Raise 
2
Raise 
-1,1
See 
1,-1
Pass 
2,-2
Meet 
1,-1
Pass 
-2,2
Meet 
Player 1 has just two strategies left, Raise and See, and the strategic
form of the game becomes:
Pass Meet
Raise 1,-1 0,0
See 0,0 0,0
The strategy (See,See) for player 1 is weakly dominated by (Raise, Raise),
so it can be liminated, and we are left with:
Pass Meet
Raise 1,-1 0,0
21The strategy pair (Raise, Meet) is a Nash equilibrium. The game theoretic
analysis predicts that a rational player 1 will always raise, and a rational
player 2 will always meet, and the game becomes a pure zero-sum game
of chance. Surely, it is the possibility of lying that makes Liar’s Dice an
interesting game.
6 Lying in Games: Epistemic Analysis
It turns out to be possible to analyse the game situation from Section 5
without leaving the realm of S5. What this means is that no actual mislead-
ing is taking place at all. A feature we do need is factual change, to model
the toss of the coin as a change in the state of the world.
Consider again the building blocks of Liar’s Dice, as analysed in Section
5. Assume we allow variables with natural number values in our basic model.
Note that this is not a real extension of the modelling, for if C is to store
numbers from 0 to 25 − 1, we can represent C as an array c0,...,c4 of
proposition letters, so that C = 15 (= 23 +22 +21 +20) gets represented as
c0 = 1,c1 = 1,c2 = 1,c3 = 1,c4 = 0.
Let p represent the value of a penny, with 1 signifying heads, and 0
signifying tails. Let C1 represent the contents of the purse of player 1 (C
for cash), and C2 that of player 2, with natural number values representing
the number euros that each player has available. Let S1,S2 represent the
money at stake for each player. Then here is how we can model the various
actions in the game:
Initialisation Both players put one euro at stake, and they both know
this. S1 := 1,C1 := C1 −1,S2 := 1,C2 := C2 −1, together with public
announcement of these factual changes.
Heads Factual change of the propositional value of a penny p to 1, with
private communication of the result to player 1 (p = 1 signiﬁes heads),
Tails Factual change of the propositional value of a penny p to 0, with
private communication of the result to player 1. (p = 0 signiﬁes tails).
Seeing public announcement of the outcome of the toss, followed by a pub-
lic announcement ‘if p then C1 := C1 + S1 + S2 otherwise C2 :=
C2 + S1 + S2’.
Raising public setting of C1 := C1 − 1,S1 := 2.
22Calling public announcement ‘if p then C1 := C1 + S1 + S2 otherwise
C2 := C2 + S1 + S2’.
Passing public setting of C1 := C1 + S1 + S2.
Meeting public setting of C2 := C1 − 1,S2 := 2, followed by public an-
nouncement ‘if p then C1 := C1+S1+S2 otherwise C2 := C2+S1+S2’.
[spell out more details, describe some runs ...]
7 Model Checking Liar’s Dice with DEMO
One of the authors (FS) has recently extended the epistemic model checker
DEMO [Eij07] with factual changes [Sie07]. We show how the basic commu-
nication actions are represented, and what the resulting epistemic models
look like if we trace a particular run of the game.
8 Conclusion
Question 1 Can we connect the game theoretical analysis of Liar’s Dice
to the logical analysis? Since the game theoretical analysis involves proba-
bilities, it looks like we should move to a probabilistic version of dynamic
epistemic logic. How?
Question 2 We have said something general about the logic of lying (the
analysis of manipulative updates), and we have analysed the logic of lying in
games. Can we say something about how the two are connected?
Question 3 Can we draw some nice philophical distinctions, and point out
their counterparts in the logic of communication and change?
Question 4 In philosophy and logic there is a long standing interest in liar
paradoxes. Now it seems that our language is not powerful enough to express
a liar paradox. What happens if we add a mechanism for self reference to
dynamic epistemic logic? Does this immediately lead to either incomplete-
ness or inconsistency? What is the simplest possible way of expressing liar
paradoxes in (an extension of) dynamic epistemic logic?
Acknowledgements Thanks to Rineke Verbrugge for comments and en-
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